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Abstract—The Guesswork problem was originally motivated
by a desire to quantify computational security for single user
systems. Leveraging recent results from its analysis, we extend
the remit and utility of the framework to the quantification of
the computational security of multi-user systems. In particular,
assume that V users independently select strings stochastically
from a finite, but potentially large, list. An inquisitor who does
not know which strings have been selected wishes to identify U
of them. The inquisitor knows the selection probabilities of each
user and is equipped with a method that enables the testing of
each (user, string) pair, one at a time, for whether that string
had been selected by that user.
Here we establish that, unless U = V , there is no general
strategy that minimizes the distribution of the number of guesses,
but in the asymptote as the strings become long we prove the
following: by construction, there is an asymptotically optimal
class of strategies; the number of guesses required in an asymp-
totically optimal strategy satisfies a Large Deviation Principle
with a rate function, which is not necessarily convex, that can be
determined from the rate functions of optimally guessing individ-
ual users’ strings; if all users’ selection statistics are identical, the
exponential growth rate of the average guesswork as the string-
length increases is determined by the specific Re´nyi entropy of the
string-source with parameter (V−U+1)/(V−U+2), generalizing
the known V = U = 1 case; and that the Shannon entropy of the
source is a lower bound on the average guesswork growth rate for
all U and V , thus providing a bound on computational security
for multi-user systems. Examples are presented to illustrate these
results and their ramifications for systems design.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of systems is often predicated on a user or
application selecting an object, a password or key, from a large
list. If an inquisitor who wishes to identify the object in order
to gain access to a system can only query each possibility,
one at a time, then the number of guesses they must make in
order to identify the selected object is likely to be large. If
the object is selected uniformly at random using, for example,
a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator,
then the analysis of the distribution of the number of guesses
that the inquisitor must make is trivial.
Since the earliest days of code-breaking, deviations from
perfect uniformity have been exploited. For example, it has
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long since been known that human-user selected passwords
are highly non-uniformly selected, e.g. [1], and this forms the
basis of dictionary attacks. In information theoretic security,
uniformity of the string source is typically assumed on the
basis that the source has been compressed. Recent work has
cast some doubt on the appropriateness of that assumption
by establishing that fewer queries are required to identify
strings chosen from a typical set than one would expect by
a naı¨ve application of the asymptotic equipartition property.
This arises by exploitation of the mild non-uniformity of the
distribution of strings conditioned to be in the typical set [2].
If the string has not been selected perfectly uniformly,
but with a distribution that is known to the inquisitor, then
the quantification of security is relatively involved. Assume
that a string, W1, is selected stochastically from a finite list,
A = {0, . . . ,m − 1}. An inquisitor who knows the selection
probabilities, P (W1 = w) for all w ∈ A, is equipped
with a method to test one string at a time and develops a
strategy, G : A 7→ {1, . . . ,m}, that defines the order in which
strings are guessed. As the string is stochastically selected,
the number of queries, G(W1), that must be made before
it is identified correctly is also a random variable, dubbed
guesswork. Analysis of the distribution of guesswork serves
as a natural a measure of computational security in brute force
determination.
In a brief paper in 1994, Massey [3] established that if
the inquisitor orders his guesses from most likely to least
likely, then the Shannon entropy of the random variable W1
bears little relation to the expected guesswork E(G(W1)) =∑
w∈AG(w)P (W1 = w), the average number of guesses
required to identify W1. Arikan [4] established that if a string,
Wk, is chosen from Ak with i.i.d. characters, again guessing
strings from most likely to least likely, then the moments of
the guesswork distribution grow exponentially in k with a rate
identified in terms of the Re´nyi entropy of the characters,
lim
k→∞
1
k
logE(G(Wk)
α) = (1 + α) log
∑
w∈A
P (W1 = w)
1/(1+α)
= αR
(
1
1 + α
)
for α > 0,
where R((1+α)−1) is the Re´nyi entropy of W1 with parameter
(1 + α)−1. In particular, the average guesswork grows as
the Re´nyi entropy with parameter 1/2, a value that is lower
bounded by Shannon entropy.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
5.
50
24
v4
  [
cs
.IT
]  
3 A
ug
 20
17
2Arikan’s result was subsequently extended significantly be-
yond i.i.d. sources [5], [6], [7], establishing its robustness.
In the generalized setting, specific Re´nyi entropy, the Re´nyi
entropy per character, plays the roˆle of Re´nyi entropy. In turn,
these results have been leveraged to prove that the guesswork
process {k−1 logG(Wk)} satisfies a Large Deviation Principle
(LDP), e.g. [8], [9], in broad generality [10]. That is, there ex-
ists a lower semi-continuous function I : [0, log(m)] 7→ [0,∞]
such that for all Borel sets B contained in [0, log(m)]
− inf
x∈B◦
I(x) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
k
logP
(
1
k
logG(Wk) ∈ B
)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
k
logP
(
1
k
logG(Wk) ∈ B
)
≤ − inf
x∈B¯
I(x), (1)
where B◦ denotes the interior of B and B¯ denotes its closure.
Roughly speaking, this implies dP (k−1 logG(Wk) ≈ x) ≈
exp(−kI(x))dx for large k. In [10] this LDP, in turn, was
used to provide direct estimates on the guesswork probability
mass function, P (G(Wk) = n) for n ∈ {1, . . . ,mk}. These
deductions, along with others described in Section IV, have
developed a quantitative framework for the process of brute
force guessing a single string.
In the present work we address a natural extension in
this investigation of brute force searching: the quantification
for multi-user systems. We are motivated by both classical
systems, such as the brute force entry to a multi-user computer
where the inquisitor need only compromise a single account,
as well as modern distributed storage services where coded
data is kept at distinct sites in a way where, owing to
coding redundancy, several, but not all, servers need to be
compromised to access the content [11], [12].
II. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTION
Assume that V users select strings independently from
Ak. An inquisitor knows the probabilities with which each
user selects their string, is able to query the correctness of
each (user, string) pair, and wishes to identify any subset
of size U of the V strings. The first question that must be
addressed is what is the optimal strategy, the ordering in
which (user, string) pairs are guessed, for the inquisitor. For
the single user system, since the earliest investigations [3],
[4], [13], [14] it has been clear that the strategy of ordering
guesses from the most to least likely string, breaking ties
arbitrarily, is optimal in any reasonable sense. Here we shall
give optimality a specific meaning: that the distribution of the
number of guesses required to identify the unknown object is
stochastically dominated by all other strategies. Amongst other
results, for the multi-user guesswork problem we establish the
following:
• If U < V , the existence of optimal guessing strategies,
those that are stochastically dominated by all other strate-
gies, is no longer assured.
• By construction, there exist asymptotically optimal strate-
gies as the strings become long.
• For asymptotically optimal strategies, we prove a large
deviation principle for their guesswork. The resulting
large deviations rate function is, in general, not convex
and so this result could not have been established by
determining how the moment generating function of the
multi-user guesswork distribution scales in string-length.
• The non-convexity of the rate function shows that, if
users’ string statistics are distinct, there may be no fixed
ordering of weakness amongst users. That is, depending
on how many guesses are made before the U users’
strings are identified, the collection of users whose strings
have been identified are likely to be distinct.
• If all V strings are chosen with the same statistics, then
the rate function is convex and the exponential growth
rate of the average guesswork as string-length increases
is the specific Re´nyi entropy of the string source with
parameter
V − U + 1
V − U + 2 ∈
{
1
2
,
2
3
,
3
4
,
4
5
,
5
6
, . . .
}
.
• For homogeneous users, from an inquisitor’s point of
view, there is a law of diminishing returns for the ex-
pected guesswork growth rate in excess number of users
(V − U ).
• For homogeneous users, from a designer’s point of view,
coming full circle to Massey’s original observation that
Shannon entropy has little quantitative relationship to
how hard it is to guess a single string, the specific
Shannon entropy of the source is a lower bound on the
average guesswork growth rate for all V and U .
These results generalize both the original guesswork studies,
where U = V = 1, as well as some of the results in [13],
[15] where, as a wiretap model, the case U = 1 and V = 2
with one of the strings selected uniformly, is considered and
scaling properties of the guesswork moments are established.
Interestingly, we shall show that that setting is one where the
LDP rate function is typically non-convex, so while results
regarding the asymptotic behavior of the guesswork moments
can be deduced from the LDP, the reverse is not true. To
circumvent the lack of convexity, we prove the main result
using the contraction principle, Theorem 4.2.1 [9], and the
LDP established in [10], which itself relies on earlier results
of work referenced above.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF USERS ON
EXPECTED GUESSWORK GROWTH RATE, AN EXAMPLE
As an exemplar that illustrates the reduction in security that
comes from having multiple users, the left panel in Figure
1 the average guesswork growth rate for an asymptotically
optimal strategy is plotted for the simplest case, a binary
alphabet with V i.i.d. Bernoulli string sources. In order to be
satisfied, the inquisitor wishes to identify U ≤ V of the strings.
The x-axis shows the excess number of guessable strings,
V −U , and the y-axis is the log2 growth rate of the expected
guesswork in string length. If the source is perfectly uniform
(i.e. characters are chosen with a Bernoulli 1/2 process), then
the average guesswork growth rate is maximal and unchanging
in V−U . If the source is not perfectly uniform, then the growth
rate decreases as the number of excess guessable strings V −U
increases, with a lower bound of the source’s Shannon entropy.
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Fig. 1. Strings created from i.i.d. letters are selected from a binary alphabet
with probability p for one character. Given an inquisitor wishes to identify U
of V strings, the left panel shows the average exponential guesswork growth
rate as a function of V −U , the excess number of guessable strings; the right
panel shows the theoretically predicted approximate average guesswork for
168 bit strings, as used in triple DES, as a function of V − U , the excess
number of guessable strings.
For a string of length 168 bits, as used in the triple DES
cipher, and a Bernoulli (0.25) source, the right panel in Figure
1 displays the impact that the change in this exponent has,
approximately, on the average number of guesses required to
determine U strings. More refined results for a broader class of
processes can be found in later sections, including an estimate
on the guesswork distribution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
IV, we begin with a brief overview of results on guesswork
that we have not touched on so far. Questions of optimal
strategy are considered in Section V. Asymptotically optimal
strategies are established to exist in Section VI and results
for these strategies appear in Section VII. In Section VIII we
present examples where strings sources have distinct statistics.
In Section IX we return to the setting where string sources
have identical statistics. Concluding remarks appear in Section
X.
IV. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF GUESSWORK
Since Arikan’s introduction of the long string length asymp-
totic, several generalizations of its fundamental assumptions
have been explored. Arikan and Boztas [16] investigate the
setting where the truthfulness in response to a query is not
certain. Arikan and Merhav [17] loosen the assumption that
inquisitor needs to determine the string exactly, assuming
instead that they only need to identify it within a given
distance. That the inquisitor knows the distribution of words
exactly is relaxed by Sundaresan [18], [19] and by the authors
of [20].
Motivated by a wiretap application, the problem of multiple
users was first investigated by Merhav and Arikan [13] in
the V = 2 and U = 1 setting, assuming one of the users
selects their string uniformly on a reduced alphabet. In [21]
Hayashi and Yamamoto extend the results in [13] to the case
if there is an additional i.i.d. source correlated to the first, used
for coding purposes, while Harountunian and Ghazaryan [22]
extend the results in [13] to the setting of [17]. Harountunian
and Margaryan [23] expand on [13] by adding noise to the
original string, altering the distribution of letters. Hanawal
and Sundaresan [15] extend the bounds in [13] to a pre-limit
and to more general sources, showing that they are tight for
Markovian and unifilar sources.
Sundaresan [24] uses length functions to identify the link
between guesswork and compression. This result is extended
by Hanawal and Sundaresan [25] to relate guesswork to the
compression of a source over a countably infinite alphabet. In
[2] the authors prove that, if the string is conditioned on being
an element of a typical set the expected guesswork, is growing
more slowly than a simple uniform approximation would
suggest. In [26] the authors consider the impact of guessing
over a noisy erasure channel showing that the mean noise
on the channel is not the significant moment in determining
the expected guesswork, but instead one determined by its
Re´nyi entropy with parameter 1/2. Finally, we mention that
recent work by Bunte and Lapidoth [27] identifies a distinct
operational meaning for Re´nyi entropy in defining a rate region
for a scheduling problem.
V. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
In order to introduce the key concepts used to determine
the optimal multi-user guesswork strategy, we first reconsider
the optimal guesswork strategy in the single user case, i.e.
U = V = 1. Recall that A = {0, . . . ,m− 1} is a finite set.
Definition 1: A single user strategy, S : Ak 7→ {1, . . . ,mk},
is a one-to-one map that determines the order in which guesses
are made. That is, for a given strategy S and a given string
w ∈ Ak, S(w) is the number of guesses made until w is
queried.
Let Wk be a random variable taking values in Ak. Assume
that its probability mass function, P (Wk = w) for all w ∈
Ak, is known. Since the first results on the topic it has been
clear that the best strategy, which we denote G, is to guess
from most likely to least likely, breaking ties arbitrarily. In
particular, G is defined by G(w) < G(w′) if P (Wk = w) >
4P (Wk = w
′). We begin by assigning optimality a precise
meaning in terms of stochastic dominance [28], [29].
Definition 2: A strategy S is optimal for Wk if the random
variable S(Wk) is stochastically dominated by S′(Wk), for all
strategies S′. That is, if P (S(Wk) ≤ n) ≥ P (S′(Wk) ≤ n)
for all strategies S′ and all n ∈ {1, . . . ,mk}.
This definition captures the stochastic aspect of guessing by
stating than an optimal strategy is one where the identification
stopping time is probabilistically smallest. One consequence
of this definition that explains its appropriateness is that for
any monotone function φ : {1, . . . ,mk} → R, it is the case
that E(φ(S(Wk))) ≤ E(φ(S′(Wk))) for an optimal S and
any other S′ (e.g. Proposition 3.3.17, [29]). Thus S(Wk) has
the least moments over all guessing strategies. That guessing
from most- to least-likely in the single user case is optimal is
readily established.
Lemma 1: If V = U = 1, the optimal strategies are
those that guess from most likely to least likely, breaking ties
arbitrarily.
PROOF: Consider the strategy G defined above and any other
strategy S. By construction, for any n ∈ {1, . . . ,mk}
P (G(Wk) ≤ n) =
n∑
i=1
P (G(Wk) = i)
= max
w1,...,wn
(
n∑
i=1
P (Wk = wi)
)
≥
n∑
i=1
P (S(Wk) = i) = P (S(Wk) ≤ n).

In the multi-user case, where (user, string) pairs are queried,
a strategy is defined by the following.
Definition 3: A multi-user strategy is a one-to-one map S :
{1, . . . , V } ×Ak 7→ {1, . . . , V mk} that orders the guesses of
(user, string) pairs.
The expression for the number of guesses required to
identify U strings is a little involved as we must take into
account that we stop making queries about a user once
their string has been identified. For a given strategy S, let
NS : {1, . . . , V } × {1, . . . , V mk} 7→ {1, . . . ,mk} be defined
by
NS(v, n) = |{w ∈ Ak : S(v, w) ≤ n}|,
which computes the number of queries in the strategy up to n
that correspond to user v.
The number of queries that need to be made if U strings
are to be identified is
T (U, V, ~w) = U-min
(
S(1, w(1)), . . . , S(V,w(V ))
)
,
where U-min : RV → R and U-min(~x) gives the U th smallest
component of ~x. The number of guesses required to identify
U components of ~w = (w(1), . . . , w(V )) is then
GS(U, V, ~w) =
V∑
v=1
NS
(
v,min
(
S(v, w(v)), T (U, V, ~w)
))
.
(2)
This apparently unwieldy object counts the number of queries
made to each user, curtailed either when their string is identi-
fied or when U strings of other users are identified.
If U = V , equation (2) simplifies significantly, as
S(v, w(v)) ≤ T (U, V, ~w) for all v ∈ {1, . . . , V }, becoming
GS(V, V, ~w) =
V∑
v=1
NS
(
v, S(v, w(v))
)
, (3)
the sum of the number of queries required to identify each
individual word. In this case, we have the analogous result to
Lemma 1, which is again readily established.
Lemma 2: If V = U , the optimal strategies are those that
employ individual optimal strategies, but with users selected
in any order.
PROOF: For any multi-user strategy S, equation (3) holds.
Consider an element in the sum on the right hand side,
NS
(
v, S(v, w(v))
)
. It can be recognized to be the number
of queries made to user v until their string is identified.
By Lemma 1, for each user v, for any S this stochastically
dominates the equivalent single user optimal strategy. Thus
the multi-user optimal strategies in this case are the sum of
individual user optimal strategies, with users queried in any
arbitrary order.

The formula (2) will be largely side-stepped when we
consider asymptotically optimal strategies, but is needed to
establish that there is, in general, no stochastically dominant
strategy if V > U . With ~Wk = (W
(1)
k , . . . ,W
(V )
k ) being a
random vector taking values in AkV with independent, not
necessarily identically distributed, components, we are not
guaranteed the existence of an S such that P (GS(U, V, ~Wk) ≤
n) ≥ (GS′(U, V, ~Wk) ≤ n) for all alternate strategies S′.
Lemma 3: If V > U , a stochastically dominant strategy
does not necessarily exist.
PROOF: A counter-example suffices and so let k = 1, V = 2,
U = 1 and A = {0, 1, 2}. Let the distributions of W (1)1 and
W
(2)
1 be
User 1 User 2
P (W
(1)
1 = 0) = 0.6 P (W
(2)
1 = 0) = 0.5
P (W
(1)
1 = 1) = 0.25 P (W
(2)
1 = 1) = 0.4
P (W
(1)
1 = 2) = 0.15 P (W
(2)
1 = 2) = 0.1
If a stochastically dominant strategy exists, its first guess must
be user 1, string 0, i.e. S(1, 0) = 1, so that P (GS(1, ~W1) =
1) = 0.6. Given this first guess, to maximize P (GS(1, ~W1) ≤
2), the second guess must be user 1, string 1, S(1, 1) = 2, so
that P (GS(1, ~W1) ≤ 2) = 0.85.
An alternate strategy with S(2, 0) = 1 and S(2, 1) =
2, however, gives P (GS′(1, ~W1) = 1) = 0.5 and
P (GS′(1, ~W1) ≤ 2) = 0.9. While P (GS(1, ~W1) = 1) >
P (GS′(1, ~W1) = 1), P (GS(1, ~W1) ≤ 2) < P (GS′(1, ~W1) ≤
2) and so there is no strategy stochastically dominated by all
others in this case.

5Despite this lack of universal optimal strategy, we shall
show that there is a sequence of random variables that are
stochastically dominated by the guesswork of all strategies
and, moreover, there exists a strategy with identical perfor-
mance in Arikan’s long string length asymptotic.
Definition 4: A strategy S is asymptotically optimal
if {k−1 logGS(U, V, ~Wk)} satisfies a LDP with the same
rate function as a sequence {k−1 log Υ(U, V, ~Wk)} where
Υ(U, V, ~Wk) is stochastically dominated by GS′(U, V, ~Wk) for
all strategies S′.
Note that Υ(U, V, ·) need not correspond to the guesswork
of a strategy.
VI. AN ASYMPTOTICALLY OPTIMAL STRATEGY
Let { ~Wk} be a sequence of random strings, with ~Wk taking
values in AkV , with independent components, W (v)k , corre-
sponding to strings selected by users 1 through V , although
each user’s string may not be constructed from i.i.d. letters.
For each individual user, v ∈ {1, . . . , V }, let G(v) denote its
single-user optimal guessing strategy; that is, guessing from
most likely to least likely.
We shall show that the following random variable, con-
structed using the G(v), is stochastically dominated by the
guesswork distribution of all strategies:
Gopt(U, V, ~Wk) = U-min
(
G(1)(W
(1)
k ), . . . , G
(V )(W
(V )
k )
)
.
(4)
This can be thought of as allowing the inquisitor to query,
for each n in turn, the nth most likely string for all users
while only accounting for a single guess and so it does not
correspond to an allowable strategy.
Lemma 4: For any strategy S and any U ∈ {1, . . . , V },
Gopt(U, V, ~Wk) is stochastically dominated by GS(U, V, ~Wk).
That is, for any any U ∈ {1, . . . , V } and any n ∈ {1, . . . ,mk}
P (Gopt(U, V, ~Wk) ≤ n) ≥ P (GS(U, V, ~Wk) ≤ n).
PROOF: Using equation (2) and the positivity of its summands,
for any strategy S
GS(U, V, ~w)
≥ U-min(NS(1, S(1, w(1))), . . . , NS(V, S(V,w(V )))).
As for each v ∈ {1, . . . , V }, G(v)(W (v)k ) is stochastically
dominated by all other strategies,
P (G(v)(W
(v)
k ) ≤ n) ≥ P (NS(v, S(1,W (v)k )) ≤ n).
Using equation (4), this implies that
P (Gopt( ~Wk) ≤ n)
≥ P (U-min(NS(1, S(1,W (1)k )), . . . , NS(V, S(V,W (V )k ))) ≤ n)
≥ P (GS(U, V, ~Wk) ≤ n),
as required.

The strategy that we construct that will asymptotically meet
the performance of the lower bound is to round-robin the
single user optimal strategies. That is, to query the most
likely string of one user followed by the most likely string
of a second user and so forth, for each user in a round-robin
fashion, before moving to the second most likely string of
each user. An upper bound on this strategy’s performance is
to consider only stopping at the end of a round of such queries,
even if they reveal more than U strings, which gives
V Gopt(U, V, ~Wk), (5)
where Gopt(U, V, ~Wk) is defined in (4).
In large deviations parlance the stochastic processes
{k−1 logGopt(U, V, ~Wk)} and {k−1 log(V Gopt(U, V, ~Wk))}
arising from equations (4) and (5) are exponentially equivalent,
e.g. Section 4.2.2 [9], as limk→∞ k−1 log V = 0. As a
result, if one process satisfies the LDP with a rate function
that has compact level sets, then the other does [9][Theorem
4.2.3]. Thus if {k−1 logGopt(U, V, ~Wk)} can be shown to
satisfy a LDP, then the round-robin strategy is proved to be
asymptotically optimal.
VII. ASYMPTOTIC PERFORMANCE OF OPTIMAL
STRATEGIES
We first recall what is known for the single-user setting.
For each individual user v ∈ {1, . . . , V }, the specific Re´nyi
entropy of the sequence {W (v)k }, should it exist, is defined by
R(v)(β) := lim
k→∞
1
k
1
1− β log
∑
wk∈Ak
P (W
(v)
k = wk)
β
for β ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), and for β = 1,
R(v)(1) := lim
β↑1
R(v)(β)
= − lim
k→∞
1
k
∑
wk∈Ak
P (W
(v)
k = wk) logP (W
(v)
k = wk),
the specific Shannon entropy. Should R(v)(β) exist for β ∈
(0,∞), then the specific min-entropy is defined
R(v)(∞) = lim
β→∞
R(v)(β)
= − lim
k→∞
1
k
max
wk∈Ak
logP (W
(v)
k = wk),
where the limit necessarily exists. The existence of R(v)(β)
for all β > 0 and its relationship to the scaled Cumulant
Generating Function (sCGF)
Λ
(v)
G (α) = lim
k→∞
1
k
logE(exp(α logG(v)(W
(v)
k )))
=
αR(v)
(
1
1 + α
)
if α > −1
−R(v)(∞) if α ≤ −1
(6)
has been established for the single user case for a broad class
of character sources that encompasses i.i.d., Markovian and
general sofic shifts that admit an entropy condition [4], [5],
[6], [7], [10]. If, in addition, R(v)(β) is differentiable with
respect to β and has a continuous derivative, it is established
6in [10] that the process {k−1 logG(v)(W (v)k )} satisfies a LDP,
i.e. equation (1), with a convex rate function
Λ
(v)
G
∗
(x) = sup
α∈R
(
xα− Λ(v)G (α)
)
. (7)
In [10], this LDP is used to deduce an approximation to the
guesswork distribution,
P (G(v)(W
(v)
k ) = n) ≈
1
n
exp
(
−kΛ(v)G
∗
(
1
k
log n
))
(8)
for large k and n ∈ {1, . . . ,mk}.
The following theorem establishes the fundamental ana-
logues of these results for an asymptotically optimal strategy,
where user strings may have distinct statistical properties.
Theorem 5: Assume that the components of { ~Wk} are
independent and that for each v ∈ {1, . . . , V } R(v)(β)
exists for all β > 0, is differentiable and has a continuous
derivative, and that equation (6) holds. Then the process
{k−1 logGopt(U, V, ~Wk)}, and thus any asymptotically opti-
mal strategy, satisfies a Large Deviation Principle. Defining
δ(v)(x) =
{
Λ
(v)
G
∗
(x) if x ≤ R(v)(1)
0 otherwise
and γ(v)(x) =
{
Λ
(v)
G
∗
(x) if x ≥ R(v)(1)
0 otherwise
,
the rate function is
IGopt(U, V, x) =
min
v1,...,vV
(
Λ
(v1)
G
∗
(x) +
U∑
i=2
δ(vi)(x) +
V∑
i=U+1
γ(vi)(x)
)
, (9)
which is lower semi-continuous and has compact level sets,
but may not be convex. The sCGF capturing how the moments
scale is
ΛGopt(U, V, α) = lim
k→∞
1
k
logE(exp(α logGopt(U, V, ~Wk)))
= sup
x∈[0,log(m)]
(
αx− IGopt(U, V, x)
)
. (10)
PROOF: Under the assumptions of the theorem, for each
v ∈ {1, . . . , V }, {k−1 logG(v)(W (v)k )} satisfies the LDP with
the rate function given in equation (7). As users’ strings are
selected independently, the sequence of vectors{(
1
k
logG(1)(W
(1)
k ), . . . ,
1
k
logG(V )(W
(V )
k )
)}
satisfies the LDP in RV with rate function I(y(1), . . . , y(V )) =∑V
v=1 Λ
(v)
G
∗
(y(v)), the sum of the rate functions given in
equation (7).
Within our setting, the contraction principle, e.g. Theorem
4.2.1 [9], states that if a sequence of random variables {Xn}
taking values in a compact subset of RV satisfies a LDP
with rate function I : RV 7→ [0,∞] and f : RV 7→ R is
a continuous function, then the sequence {f(Xn)} satisfies
the LDP with rate function inf~y{I(~y) : f(~y) = x}.
Assume, without loss of generality, that ~x ∈ RV is such that
x(1) < x(2) < · · · < x(V ), so that U-min(~x) = x(U), and let
~xn = (x
(1)
n , . . . , x
(V )
n ) → ~x. Let  < inf{x(v) − x(v−1) : v ∈
{2, . . . , V }}. There exists N such that maxv=1,...,V |x(v)n −
x(v)| <  for all n > N. Thus for all v ∈ {2, . . . , V } and
all n > N x
(v)
n − x(v−1)n > x(v) − x(v−1) −  > 0 and
so |U-min(~xn) − U-min(~x)| = |x(U)n − x(U)| < . Hence
U-min : RV → R is a continuous function and that a LDP
holds follows from an application of the contraction principle,
giving the rate function
IGopt(U, V, x) = inf
{
V∑
v=1
Λ
(v)
G
∗
(yv) : U-min(y1, . . . , yV ) = x
}
.
This expression simplifies to that in equation (9) by elementary
arguments. The sCGF result follows from an application of
Varahadan’s Lemma, e.g [9, Theorem 4.3.1].

The expression for the rate function in equation (9) lends
itself to a useful interpretation. In the long string-length
asymptotic, the likelihood that an inquisitor has identified U
of the V users’ strings after approximately exp(kx) queries is
contributed to by three distinct groups of identifiable users. For
given x, the argument in the first term (v1) identifies the last
of the U users whose string is identified. The second summed
term is contributed to by the collection of users, (v2) to (vU ),
whose strings have already been identified prior to exp(kx)
queries, while the final summed term corresponds to those
users, (vU+1) to (vV ), whose strings have not been identified.
The reason for using the notation IGopt(U, V, ·) in lieu
of Λ∗Gopt(U, V, ·) for the rate function in Theorem 5 is that
IGopt(U, V, ·) is not convex in general, which we shall demon-
strate by example, and so is not always the Legendre-Fenchel
transform of the sCGF ΛGopt(U, V, ·). Instead
Λ∗Gopt(U, V, x) = sup
α
(
αx− ΛGopt(U, V, α)
)
forms the convex hull of IGopt(U, V, ·). In particular, this means
that we could not have proved Theorem 5 by establishing
properties of ΛGopt(U, V, ·) alone, which was the successful
route taken for the U = V = 1 setting, and instead needed
to rely on the LDP proved in [10]. Indeed, in the setting
considered in [13], [15] with U = 1, V = 2, with one of the
strings chosen uniformly, while the authors directly identify
ΛGopt(1, 2, α) for α > 0, one cannot establish a full LDP from
this approach as the resulting rate function is not convex.
Convexity of the rate function defined in equation (9) is
ensured, however, if all users select strings using the same
stochastic properties, whereupon the results in Theorem 5
simplify greatly.
Corollary 1: If, in addition to the assumptions of Theorem
5, Λ(v)G (·) = ΛG(·) for all v ∈ {1, . . . , V } with corresponding
Re´nyi entropy R(·), then the rate function in equation (7)
simplifies to the convex function
Λ∗Gopt(U, V, x) =
{
UΛG
∗(x) if x ≤ R(1)
(V − U + 1)ΛG∗(x) if x ≥ R(1)
(11)
7where R(1) is the specific Shannon entropy, and the sCGF in
equation (10) simplifies to
ΛGopt(U, V, α) =

UΛG
( α
U
)
if α ≤ 0
(V − U + 1)ΛG
(
α
V − U + 1
)
if α ≥ 0.
(12)
In particular, with α = 1 we have
lim
k→∞
1
k
logE
(
Gopt(U, V, ~Wk)
)
= ΛGopt(1)
= (V − U + 1)ΛG
(
1
V − U + 1
)
= R
(
V − U + 1
V − U + 2
)
, (13)
where R((n+1)/(n+2))−R((n+2)/(n+3)) is a decreasing
function of n ∈ N.
PROOF: The simplification in equation (11) follows readily
from equation (9). To establish that R((n + 1)/(n + 2)) −
R((n+2)/(n+3)) is a decreasing function of n ∈ N, it suffices
to establish that R((x + 1)/(x + 2)) is a convex, decreasing
function for x ∈ R+.
That R(x) ↓ R(1) as x ↑ 1 is a general property of specific
Re´nyi entropy. For convexity, using equation (13) it suffices
to show that xΛG(1/x) is convex for x > 0. This can be seen
by noting that for any a ∈ (0, 1) and x1, x2 > 0,
(ax1 + (1− a)x2)ΛG
(
1
ax1 + (1− a)x2
)
= (ax1 + (1− a)x2)ΛG
(
η
1
x1
+ (1− η) 1
x2
)
≤ ax1ΛG
(
1
x1
)
+ (1− a)x2ΛG
(
1
x2
)
,
where η = ax1/(ax1 + (1− a)x2) ∈ (0, 1) and we have used
the convexity of ΛG.

As the growth rate, R((n+1)/(n+2))−R((n+2)/(n+3)),
is decreasing there is a law of diminishing returns for the
inquisitor where the greatest decrease in the average guess-
work growth rate is through the provision of one additional
user. From the system designer’s point of view, the specific
Shannon entropy of the source is a universal lower bound on
the exponential growth rate of the expected guesswork that,
while we cannot take the limit to infinity, is tight for large
V − U .
Regardless of whether the rate function IGopt(U, V, ·) is
convex, Theorem 6, which follows, justifies the approximation
P (Gopt(U, V, ~Wk) = n) ≈ 1
n
exp
(
−kIGopt
(
U, V,
1
k
log n
))
for large k and n ∈ {1, . . . ,mk}. It is analogous to that in
equation (8), first developed in [10], but there are additional
difficulties that must be overcome to establish it. In particular,
if U = V = 1, the likelihood that the string is identified at
each query is a decreasing function of guess number, but this
is not true in the more general case.
As a simple example, consider U = V = 2, A = {0, 1},
strings of length 1 and strings chosen uniformly. Here the
probability of guessing both strings in one guess is 1/4, but at
the second guess it is 3/4. Despite this lack of monotonicity,
the approximation still holds in the following sense.
Theorem 6: Under the assumptions of Theorem 5, for any
x ∈ [0, logm) we have
lim
↓0
lim inf
k→∞
1
k
log inf
n∈Kk(x,)
P (Gopt(U, V, ~Wk) = n)
= lim
↓0
lim sup
k→∞
1
k
log sup
n∈Kk(x,)
P (Gopt(U, V, ~Wk) = n)
= −IGopt(U, V, x)− x,
where
Kk(x, ) = {n : n ∈ (exp(k(x− )), exp((k(x+ )))}
is the collection of guesses made in a log-neighborhood of x.
PROOF: The proof follows the ideas in [10] Corollary 4, but
with the added difficulties resolved by isolating the last word
that is likely to be guessed and leveraging the monotonicity it
its individual likelihood of being identified.
Noting the definition of Kk(x, ) in the statement of the
theorem, consider for x ∈ (0, log(m))
sup
n∈Kk(x,)
P (Gopt(U, V, ~Wk) = n)
= sup
n∈Kk(x,)
∑
(v1,...,vV )
P (G(v1)(W
(v1)
k ) = n)
U∏
i=2
P (G(vi)(W
(vi)
k ) ≤ n)
V∏
i=U+1
P (G(vi)(W
(vi)
k ) ≥ n)
≤ sup
n∈Kk(x,)
max
(v1,...,vV )
(V !)P (G(v1)(W
(v1)
k ) = n)
U∏
i=2
P (G(vi)(W
(vi)
k ) ≤ n)
V∏
i=U+1
P (G(vi)(W
(vi)
k ) ≥ n)
≤ sup
n∈Kk(x,)
max
(v1,...,vV )
(V !)P (G(v1)(W
(v1)
k ) = n)
U∏
i=2
P
(
1
k
logG(vi)(W
(vi)
k ) ≤ x− 
)
V∏
i=U+1
P
(
1
k
logG(vi)(W
(vi)
k ) ≥ x+ 
)
≤ inf
n∈Kk(x−2,)
max
(v1,...,vV )
(V !)P
(
1
k
logG(v1)(W
(v1)
k ) = n
)
U∏
i=2
P
(
1
k
logG(vi)(W
(vi)
k ) ≤ x+ 
)
V∏
i=U+1
P
(
1
k
logG(vi)(W
(vi)
k ) ≥ x− 
)
.
The first equality holds by definition of Gopt(U, V, ·). The first
inequality follows from the union bound over all possible
permutations of {1, . . . , V }. The second inequality utilizes
8k−1 log n ∈ (x − , x + ) if n ∈ Kk(x, ), while the
third inequality uses the monotonic decreasing probabilities
in guessing a single user’s string.
Taking lim↓0 lim supk→∞ k
−1 log on both sides of the
inequality, interchanging the order of the max and the supre-
mum, using the continuity of Λ(v)G (·) for each v ∈ {1, · · · , V },
and the representation of the rate function IGopt(U, V, ·) in
equation (9), gives the upper bound
lim
↓0
lim sup
k→∞
1
k
log sup
n∈Kk(x,)
P (Gopt( ~Wk) = n)
≤ −IGopt(U, V, x)− x.
Considering the least likely guesswork in the ball leads to a
matching lower bound. The other case, x = 0, follows similar
logic, leading to the result.

We next provide some illustrative examples of what these
results imply, returning to using log2 in figures.
VIII. MISMATCHED STATISTICS EXAMPLE
The potential lack of convexity in the rate function of
Theorem 5, equation (9), only arises if users’ string statistics
are asymptotically distinct. The significance of this lack of
convexity on the phenomenology of guesswork can be un-
derstood in terms of the asymptotically optimal round-robin
strategy: if the rate function is not convex, there is no single
set of users whose strings are most vulnerable. That is, if U
strings are recovered after a small number of guesses, they
will be from one set of users, but after a number of guesses
corresponding to a transition from the initial convexity they
will be from another set of users. This is made explicit in the
following corollary to Theorem 5.
Corollary 2: If IGopt(U, V, x) is not convex in x, then there
is there is no single set of users whose strings will be identified
in the long string length asymptotic.
PROOF: We prove the result by establishing the contrapo-
sition: if a single set of users is always most vulnera-
ble, then IGopt(U, V, x) is convex. Recall the expression for
IGopt(U, V, x) given in equation (9)
IGopt(U, V, x) =
min
v1,...,vV
(
Λ
(v1)
G
∗
(x) +
U∑
i=2
δ(vi)(x) +
V∑
i=U+1
γ(vi)(x)
)
,
As explained after Theorem 5, for given x the set of users
{(v1), . . . , (vU )} corresponds to those users whose strings, on
the scale of large deviations, will be identified by the inquisitor
after approximately exp(kx) queries. If this set is unchanging
in x, i.e. the same set of users is identified irrespective of x,
then both of the functions(
Λ
(v1)
G
∗
(x) +
U∑
i=2
δ(vi)(x)
)
and
V∑
i=U+1
γ(vi)(x)
are sums of functions that are convex in x, and so are convex
themselves. Thus the sum of them, IGopt(U, V, x), is convex.
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Fig. 2. User 1 picks a uniform bit string. User 2 picks a non-uniform
i.i.d. byte string. The straight line starting at (0, 1) displays ΛG(1)
∗
(x), the
large deviations rate function for guessing the uniform bit string. The convex
function starting below it is ΛG(2)
∗
(x), the rate function for guessing the non-
uniform byte string. The highlighted line, which is the minimum of the two
rate functions until x = 1 and then +∞ afterwards, displays IGopt (1, 2, x),
as determined by (9), the rate function for an inquisitor to guess one of the two
strings. Its non-convexity demonstrates that initially it is the bytes that are most
likely to be revealed by brute force searching, but eventually it is the uniform
bits that are more likely to be identified. The Legendre-Fenchel transform of
the scaled cumulant generating function of the guesswork distributions would
form the convex hull of the highlighted line and so this could not be deduced
by analysis of the asymptotic moments.

This is most readily illustrated by an example that falls
within the two-user setting of [13], where one string is
constructed from uniformly from i.i.d. bits and the other string
from non-uniformly selected i.i.d. bytes.
Let A = {0, . . . , 7}, U = 1 and V = 2. Let one character
source correspond to the output of a cryptographically secure
pseudo-random number generator. That is, despite having a
byte alphabet, the source produces perfectly uniform i.i.d. bits,
P (W
(1)
1 = i) =
{
1/2 if i ∈ {0, 1}
0 otherwise.
The other source can be thought of as i.i.d. bytes generated
by a non-uniform source,
P (W
(2)
1 = i) =

0.55 if i = 0
0.1 if i ∈ {1, 2}
0.05 if i ∈ {3, . . . , 7}.
This models the situation of a piece of data, a string from
the second source, being encrypted with a shorter, perfectly
uniform key. The inquisitor can reveal the hidden string by
guessing either the key or the string. One might suspect that
either the key or the string is necessarily more susceptible to
being guessed, but the result is more subtle.
Figure 2 plots the rate functions for guessing each of the
user’s strings individually as well as the rate function for
guessing one out of two, determined by equation (9), which in
9this case is the minimum of the two rate function where they
are finite. The y-axis is the exponential decay-rate in string
length k of the likelihood of identification given approximately
exp(kx) guesses, where x is on the x-axis, have been made.
The rate function reveals that if the inquisitor identifies one of
the strings quickly, it will be the non-uniform byte string, but
after a certain number of guesses it is the key, the uniform bit
string, that is identified.
Attempting to obtain this result by taking the Legendre
Fenchel transform of the sCGF identified in [13] results in
the convex hull of this non-convex function, which has no
real meaning. This explains the necessity for the distinct proof
approach taken here if one wishes to develop estimates on the
guesswork distribution rather than its moments.
IX. IDENTICAL STATISTICS EXAMPLES
When the string statistics of users are asymptotically the
same, the resulting multi-user guesswork rate functions are
convex by Corollary 1, and the roˆle of specific Shannon
entropy in analyzing expected multi-user guesswork appears.
This is the setting that leads to the results in Section III
where it is assumed that character statistics are i.i.d., but not
necessarily uniform.
An alternate means of departure from string-selection uni-
formity is that the appearance of characters within the string
may be correlated. The simplest model of this is where
string symbols are governed by a Markov chain with arbitrary
starting distribution and transition matrix(
1− a a
b 1− b
)
,
where a, b ∈ (0, 1). The specific Re´nyi entropy of this
character source can be evaluated, e.g. [5], for β 6= 1 to be
R(β) =
1
1− β log
(
(1− a)β + (1− b)β
+
√
((1− a)β − (1− b)β)2 + 4(ab)β
)
− 1
1− β
and R(1) is the Shannon entropy
R(1) =
b
a+ b
H(a) +
a
a+ b
H(b),
where H(a) = −a log(a)− (1− a) log(1− a).
Figure 3 shows R(1/2) − R(1) the difference between
the average guesswork growth rate for a single user system
versus one for an arbitrarily large number of users as a and b
are varied. Heavily correlated sources or those with unlikely
characters give the greatest discrepancy in security.
If a = b, then the stationary likelihood a symbol is a 0 or 1
is equal, but symbol occurrence is correlated. In that setting,
the string source’s specific Re´nyi entropy gives for β 6= 1
R(β) =
1
1− β log
(
(1− a)β + aβ) ,
which is the same as a Bernoulli source with probability a
of one character. Thus the results in Section III can be re-
read with the Bernoulli string source with parameter p = a
substituted for a Markovian string source whose stationary
distribution gives equal weight to both alphabet letters, but
for which character appearance is correlated.
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Fig. 3. Markovian string source over a binary alphabet A = {0, 1} with a
being the probability of a 1 after a 0 and b being the probability of a 0 after a
1. The plots shows the difference in average guesswork exponent for a single
user system and a system with an arbitrarily large number of users, a measure
of computational security reduction.
X. DISCUSSION
Since Massey [3] posed the original guesswork problem and
Arikan [4] introduced its long string asymptotic, generaliza-
tions have been used to quantify the computational security of
several systems, including being related to questions of loss-
less compression. Here we have considered what appears to be
one of the most natural extensions of that theory, that of multi-
user computational security. As a consequence of the inherent
non-convex nature of the guesswork rate function unless string
source statistics are equal for all users, this development wasn’t
possible prior to the Large Deviation Principle proved in [10].
The results therein themselves relied on the earlier work that
determined the scaled cumulant generating function for the
guesswork for a broad class of process [4], [5], [6], [7].
The fact that rate functions can be non-convex encapsulates
that distinct subsets of users are likely to be identified depend-
ing on how many unsuccessful guesses have been made. As a
result, a simple ordering of string guessing difficulty is inap-
propriate in multi-user systems and suggests that quantification
of multi-user computational security is inevitably nuanced.
The original analysis of the asymptotic behavior of single
user guesswork identified an operational meaning to specific
Re´nyi entropy. In particular, the average guesswork grows ex-
ponentially in string length with an exponent that is the specific
Re´nyi entropy of the character source with parameter 1/2.
When users’ string statistics are the same, the generalization
to multi-user guesswork identifies a surprising operational roˆle
for specific Re´nyi entropy with parameter n/(n+ 1) for each
n ∈ N when n is the excess number of strings that can be
guessed. Moreover, while the specific Shannon entropy of the
string source was found in the single user problem to have an
unnatural meaning as the growth rate of the expected logarithm
of the guesswork, in the multi-user system it arises as the
universal lower bound on the average guesswork growth rate.
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For the asymptote at hand, the key message is that there
is a law of diminishing returns for an inquisitor as the
number of users increases. For a multi-user system designer, in
contrast to the single character, single user system introduced
in [3], Shannon entropy is the appropriate measure of expected
guesswork for systems with many users.
Future work might consider the case where the V strings
are not selected independently, as was assumed here, but are
instead linear functions of U independent strings. A potential
application of such a case, suggested by Erdal Arikan (Bilkent
University) in a personal communication, envisages the use of
multi-user guesswork to characterize the behavior of parallel
concatenated decoders operating on blocks of convolutionally
encoded symbols passed though a preliminary algebraic block
Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code, e.g. [30]. The
connection between guessing and convolutional codes was first
established by Arikan [4].
Decoding over a channel may, in general, be viewed as
guessing a codeword that has been chosen from a list of possi-
ble channel input sequences, given the observation of an output
sequence formed by corrupting the input sequence according
to some probability law used to characterize the channel, e.g
[26]. Considering sequential decoding of convolutional codes,
first proposed by Wozencraft [31], that guessing may constitute
an exploration along a decision tree of the possible input
sequences that could have led to the observed output sequence,
as modeled by Fano [32]. If the transmitted rate, given by the
logarithm of the cardinality of possible codewords, falls below
the cut-off rate, then results in [4] prove that the guesswork
remains in expectation less than exponential in the length of
the code. Beyond the cut-off rate, it becomes exponentially
large. One may view such a result as justifying the frequent use
of cut-off rate as as a practical, engineering characterization
of the limitations of block and convolutional codes.
Consider now the following construction of a type of con-
catenated code [30], which is a slight variant of that proposed
by Falconer [33]. The original data, a stream of i.i.d. symbols,
is first encoded using an algebraic block MDS code. For a
block MDS code, such as a Reed-Solomon code [30], over
a codeword constituted by a sequence of V symbols, correct
reception at the output of any U symbols from the V allows
for correct decoding, where the feasibility of a pair of V and
U depends on the family of codes. For every U input symbols
in the data stream, V symbols are generated by the algebraic
block MDS code. Note that these symbols may be selected
over a set of large cardinality, for instance by taking each
symbol to be a string of bits. As successive input blocks of
length U are processed by the block MDS code, these symbols
form V separate streams of symbols. Each of these V streams
emanating from the algebraic block MDS code is coded using
a separate but identical convolutional encoder.
The V convolutional codewords thus obtained are depen-
dent, even though any U of them are mutually independent.
This dependence is imputed by the fact that the V convolu-
tional codewords are created by U original streams that form
the input of the block MDS encoder. The V convolutional
codewords constitute then the inputs to V mutually indepen-
dent, Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMCs), all governed by
the same probability law. In Falconer’s construct, such parallel
DMCs are embodied by time-sharing equally a single DMC.
While Falconer envisages independent DMCs governed by a
single probability law, as is suitable in the setting of interleav-
ing over a single DMC, we may readily extend the scheme to
the case where the parallel DMCs have different behaviors.
Such a model is natural in wireless settings where several
channels are used in parallel, say over different frequencies.
While the behavior of such channels is often well modeled
as being mutually independent, and the channels individually
are well approximated as being DMCs, the characteristics of
the channels, which may vary slowly in time, generally differ
considerably from each other at any time.
Decoding uses the outputs of the V DMCs as follows.
For each DMC, the output is initially individually decoded
using sequential decoding so that, in the words of Falconer,
”controlled by the Fano algorithm, all [V ] sequential decoders
simultaneously and independently attempt to proceed along the
correct path in their own trees”. The dependence among the
streams produced by the original application of the block MDS
code entails that, when U sequential decoders each correctly
guesses a symbol, the correct guesses determine a block of
U original data symbols. The latter are communicated to all
remaining V −U sequential decoders, eliminating the need for
them to continue producing guesses regarding that block of U
original data symbols. The sequential decoders then proceed to
continue attempting to decode the next block of U original data
symbols. This scheme allows the U most fortunate guesses
out of V to dominate the performance of the overall decoder.
A sequential decoder that was a laggard for one block of the
original U symbols may prove to be a leader for another block
of U symbols.
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